Below, Roshelle attempts to summarize her understanding of the views that challenge her proposal in From Resource to Relation:

What should be prioritized when looking at American resource extraction is not ‘relationality', but speed and scale.

  • The U.S. faces real economic and national security risks if it depends on other countries for critical minerals 

  • Slow permitting and regulatory complications already make it difficult to develop mines domestically

  • Large-scale resource development requires centralized, predictable systems, not place-by-place negotiation

Rare earth elements are not just another set of minerals, they are essential to modern life and national defense. They are used in everything from electric vehicles and wind turbines to fighter jets and missile systems. Because of this, U.S. officials increasingly describe access to these materials as a national security issue, not just an economic one. The challenge is that China currently dominates the global supply chain, especially in processing and refining. This creates a risk: if supply is disrupted, key industries and defense systems could be affected. From this perspective, speed matters.

Mining projects in the United States already take a long time to approve, often close to a decade from discovery to production, due to environmental reviews and permitting requirements. Supporters of faster development argue that adding new layers of decision-making, such as shared governance or expanded consent processes, could slow things down even more. That delay could discourage companies from investing in U.S. projects and instead push them toward countries with faster approval timelines.

There is also a practical concern about complexity, as the national supply chain for rare earths involves many moving parts: mining, processing, refining, manufacturing, and coordination across multiple states and federal agencies. A system built around local, place-based governance or shared authority may work well in specific regions, but it could be difficult to apply consistently across the entire country. Policymakers focused on national security tend to prioritize systems that are predictable, streamlined, and easier to coordinate at scale.

From this point of view, the goal is not to rethink mining itself, but to make it work better within existing systems. That means improving environmental protections, investing in cleaner technologies, and increasing domestic production as quickly and efficiently as possible…and the legal foundation to do so already exists within our government. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for example, requires federal agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major projects before approval, including mining operations. In practice, this has led to Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) that evaluate effects on water, wildlife, and local communities, while also requiring public input. 

Similarly, Executive Order 13175 mandates that federal agencies consult with Tribal governments when actions may affect their lands or rights, recognizing tribes as sovereign governments rather than simple stakeholders. If implemented more consistently and transparently, these tools could strengthen environmental oversight and Indigenous engagement without fundamentally restructuring permitting systems. In this view, improving coordination between agencies, enforcing timelines, and ensuring consultations are meaningful, but not indefinite, could strike a balance between inclusion and efficiency. While more inclusive governance models may offer long-term benefits, this perspective holds that the immediate priority is securing supply, because without that, broader goals like energy transition and technological independence (and with it, strengthening national security) may not be achievable.

Author's Response to LtA

Where I Agree:

  • The United States faces real economic and national security risks if it depends on other countries for critical minerals, particularly given that rare earth elements are essential to modern life and defense systems, making supply chain security a legitimate policy priority.

  • Current permitting and regulatory processes can be slow and complex, and large-scale resource development requires coordination across multiple agencies and jurisdictions, benefiting from systems that are predictable, streamlined, and scalable.

  • Existing legal tools such as NEPA and tribal consultation requirements already provide a foundation for environmental oversight and Indigenous engagement, and improving their implementation, coordination, and transparency could strengthen outcomes without fully redesigning the system.

Where I Disagree

  • The assumption that speed and scale must take precedence over relational governance, and the implication that efficiency and relational accountability are inherently in tension, rather than potentially co-dependent over the long term.

  • The framing of shared governance, indigenous governance or expanded consent processes (like FPIC) as sources of delay or merely additional procedural layers, rather than as critical, structural features that can shape how decisions are made.

  • The idea that place-based or relational approaches cannot scale across a national system, and the premise that the goal should be to improve mining within existing frameworks without considering  what those systems are designed to optimize.

The United States does face real vulnerabilities in its reliance on foreign critical mineral supply chains, particularly given China's dominance in processing and refining. In that context, the emphasis on speed, scale, and coordination is not misplaced. Mining projects in the United States are often slow to develop, and regulatory complexity can discourage investment or shift it elsewhere. Any serious proposal for change must account for these constraints. At the same time, the disagreement is not about whether efficiency or national coordination matter, but about how they are defined and what they are built to serve.

The current system is not neutral. It is already optimized for throughput, predictability, and strategic supply, and those priorities shape both its strengths and its limitations. The question is not whether to add new layers onto that system, but whether the underlying logic guiding it is sufficient for the kinds of impacts mining produces. Relational governance is often framed as a potential source of delay, but that framing assumes that existing processes are functioning optimally. In practice, many conflicts, project cancellations, and long-term liabilities emerge precisely because relationships with affected communities and ecosystems are not adequately accounted for early in the process. In that sense, incorporating Indigenous governance and ongoing consent is not simply about inclusion, it is about reducing systemic risk by aligning decision-making with the realities on the ground.

This also clarifies the distinction between stakeholders and governments, as when Indigenous nations are treated as just stakeholders, engagement is limited and procedural, but when recognized as governments, authority becomes shared across the lifecycle of projects, enabling more durable/enduring forms of accountability. 

Examples such as British Columbia show that shared governance and scale are not mutually exclusive; what changes isn't just capacity, but underlying priorities. I'd also argue that a system that can incorporate Indigenous governance is also better positioned to account for ecological limits and intergenerational responsibility in true relational fashion.

Ultimately, the question is not whether the United States should secure critical mineral supply chains, but how. A system built solely around speed and output risks long-term instability, while a relational approach reframes efficiency to include the durability of the relationships mining depends on.